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IN JOHN YENCH’S PROJECT
In the title above it is a declared conviction that John Yench’s universal
language (Idirl) has its provenance in G. W. Leibniz’s project. The problem
is thus located in a precisely determined conceptual framework: what is,
or should a universal language be? However, in order to ask responsibly
whether Yench’s modern-day project is a development of the considera-
tions of this German philosopher. It is first required to define how the term
“universal language” is used in this text. This will enable us to explore
the topic clearly and unambiguously and make it possible to present the
Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language as a continuation of
Leibniz’s idea.
In philosophical or linguistic literature the term “universal language”
often appears in different contexts and therefore a coherent definition is
difficult to reach. At the moment the first questions about the origins of
language arose, there also arose questions about the causes of the multi-
plicity of languages and of evaluating their variety. Along with the first
contacts with other language users our language begins to become a barrier
– an inaccurate, malfunctioning tool. Both cognition and communication
(which are legitimized by language) prove to be imperfect.
In European Culture a dual attempt to cope with this problem has
appeared. The first was reconstruction: the Adamic language (a return to the
order of Paradise and the language received from God) or the reconstruction
of the protolanguage (inspired by comparative linguistics). Obviously each
of these attempts originated from completely different understanding of the
origin of language. Although it should be noted that it is meant to be
a return to, with certain reservations, a natural language.
When these two kinds of reconstruction are compared, then some termi-
nological problems appear. In professional literature the linguistic projects of
e.g. Leibniz, John Wilkins or George Dalgarno are (sometimes interchange-
ably) designated: universal languages or perfect languages. However, this is
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imprecise because not every perfect language has to be a universal language
– and sometimes perfect languages were understood (even by their construc-
tors) as not ultimately universal. One example of an attempt to reconstruct
this situation will be discussed in detail: The reconstruction of the Adamic
language and certain nationalistic hypotheses associated with this imply the
perfection and universality of this language. Nevertheless, the reconstruction
of protolanguage (within the confines of comparative linguistics) presumes
the universal character of these languages (on the assumption of the mono-
genetic hypothesis) but do not imply the paralanguage’s perfection, which
was very often considered as wholly imperfect.
The second means of dealing with the multiplicity of languages, which
the projects of both the thinkers in the title belong to, is connected with
the construction of a language. Such projects are often called artificial lan-
guages, which causes some misunderstandings. It is possible to come across
the view that all languages are artificial, because “they emerge in society
and undergo its active influence”.1 Or, as Barbara Stanosz considers: “the
detailed construction of any language is not biologically determined; it is
invented – for better or worse – by our ancestors, and in this sense all human
languages are ‘artificial’”.2
However, it must be stressed that determining which language projects
are constructed languages (as opposed to those which are reconstructed),
is not an easy task. There is a problem even with such projects as: cosmic
languages, mathematical languages and logical languages. Also any attempt
at systematizing constructed languages can add many problems and uncer-
tainties because it is possible to divide them from many points of view:
whether they are pasigraphical (universal writing and alphabet) or pasila-
lical projects (designed also for speech).3 It is possible to distinguish them
into unilinguas or paninterlinguas – the first term concerns languages which
are intended to be the sole language in general use; the second concerns
common languages which would function on a basis of full equality of rights
with natural languages.4
In the division below a different set of characteristics, in order to situate
the considerations of Leibniz as well as to indicate the degree to which John
1 M. Susskin, Paninterlingwa. Powszechny język międzynarodowy, PWN, Warszawa
1990, p. 16. (fragment translated by E. K.).
2 B. Stanosz, Wprowadzenie do logiki formalnej, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 91. (frag-
ment translated by E. K.).
3 See about this distinction: M. Jurkowski, Od wieży Babel do języka kosmitów, KAW,
Białystok 1986, p. 34.
4 See M. Susskin, op. cit.
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Yench’s project is a continuation of the thought of the German philosopher,
has been used.
Constructed universal languages are created by individuals or groups
of people. From the beginning they have designated functions and roles
(true cognition and/or unlimited communication), are ahistorical and not
spontaneous. The universal character of such projects depends on the degree
to which people can learn and use such a language. All such projects can
by divided into two main classes:
1) Universal a priori languages – whose vocabulary is not based on existing
(national) languages. The grammar and vocabulary of such projects
are based on philosophical reasoning and try to categorize the whole of
human knowledge and experience.
2) Universal a posteriori languages – whose vocabulary is based on existing
(national) languages. Such languages have simplified grammar and do
not try to categorize the whole of human knowledge.
Almost all the attempts at creating universal languages made thus far were
connected with constructing philosophical languages (in first half of the XIX
century) and the XVII century is sometimes called the age of such languages
(because of the number of constructed projects). Since the creation of the
first a posteriori language Volapük (in the second half of the XIX century)
which gained international prominence an era of international a posteriori
languages began.
The projects of the thinkers in the title – Leibniz and Yench – are
a priori languages. However, the Idirl project published in 2003 is peculiar
against the background of other modern ideas. The activity of a priori lan-
guage constructors almost entirely ceased along with the appearance of the
first a posteriori languages. All activity in this area has been based on natu-
ral languages – suffice it to mention The International Auxiliary Language
Association (IALA) founded in 1924, whose first director of the Department
of Linguistic Research was Edward Sapir, or the Toki pona language, which
was intended to confirm the truth of the linguistic relativity hypothesis
(Sapir-Whorf hypothesis).
Presenting the full development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s view
on universal language and his considerations on the role of language in his
metaphysical system is beyond the scope of this text. So, of necessity we
must limit ourselves to a description of the most important elements.5
5 See an interesting and exhaustive study about the role of language in philosophy




The German philosopher has never presented a completed project of
a universal language. However his ideas exerted a strong influence on sub-
sequent constructors. From beginning of his scientific activity the idea of
creating a universal language accompanied him. Unlike his predecessors
(who mainly saw universal language as a tool for the exchange of infor-
mation and a means of improving travel and trade) it is possible to find in
Leibniz’s projects a sensitivity to religious issues and universal language (as
instrument of discovering truth) could serve the achievement of peace and
European unity.6
Leibniz knew the projects of George Dalgarno or John Wilkins when
he sketched different attempts at constructing universal languages.7 He also
referred to the work of Descartes as mentioned in a 1629 letter to Mersenne.
The project which he spent his entire life working on was a powerful philo-
sophical-linguistic construction. The overall shape of Leibniz’s project is
presented by Umberto Eco as a set of four major aspects:8
1) identification of a system of primitives, organized in an alphabet of
thought;
2) the elaboration of an ideal grammar, of which simplified Latin is one
example;
3) the formulation of a series of rules governing the possible pronunciation
of the characters;
4) the elaboration of a lexicon of the real, which would automatically lead
to the formulation of true propositions.
The German philosopher realized the diversity of natural language but
he considered that each national language to be the expression of an interior
language of thoughts. Through research on existing languages it is possible
to reach the structure of mind and single out primary ideas through universal
language.
In 1666 Leibniz published the dissertation De arte combinatoria and
obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy. He wrote that all concepts (even
compound ones) are only combinations of simple concepts. These concepts
(just as words are compounded from letters) are extremely differentiated
combinations.
6 U. Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, trans. J. Fentress, Blackwell Publi-
shing, 1995, p. 271.
7 In the III vol. of New Essays on Human Understanding Leibniz wrote: “Perhaps
there are some artificial languages which are wholly chosen and completely arbitrary, as
that of China is believed to have been, or like those of George Dalgarno and the late Bishop
Wilkins of Chester”. G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, Cambridge
University Press, 1996, p. 279.
8 See U. Eco, op. cit., p. 270.
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He thought that each compound concept can be reduced to simpler con-
cepts by its definition and in this way it is possible to achieve indivisible
components. These components through applying the appropriate calculus
will serve to encompass all of human knowledge. He considered that the set
of simple concepts is complete and constitutes an “alphabet of thoughts”
which can be arranged as in calculus. Leibniz presented a sketch of combi-
natorics and a means to establish numerical calculus. He treated combina-
torics as a “science of possible forms or objective structures”.9 Using this
method, and simple concepts, people can construct totally true sentences.
Through the discovery of simple concepts and a method of fitting them
together people can make a foolproof tool for acquiring knowledge and to
model the order of ideas contained in the mind. Leibniz tried to construct
a practical language but arrived at a language intended only for logical cal-
culus, which over time became the language of modern symbolic logic. The
philosopher rejected semantics and reduced his language to pure syntax.
He considered that his project could be applied anywhere where reasoning
could be employed.
Leibniz wrote in the Preface to the General Science:
It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs suited for expressing
all our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers
or geometry expresses lines, we could do in all matters insofar as they are
subject to reasoning all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry. For all
investigations which depend on reasoning would be carried out by transposing
these characters and by a species of calculus.10
The dissertation included only the general principles of the calculus.
In 1679 Leibniz wrote the treatise Elementa characteristicae universalis
in which he presented trial constructions inspired by mathematical sym-
bolics. He developed the principles presented in De arte combinatoria and
suggested the use of prime numbers to mark simple concepts.
Leibniz noticed that a language based on the art of combinatorics could
create problems. In the work Lingua Generalis he suggested replacing the
nine Arabic numerals with the first nine consonants of the Latin alphabet.
He wanted to use vowels to mark the decimal unit.
But such experiments did not give him what he intended: the discovery
of the calculus of thought – a universal language which would be consistent
9 H. Święczkowska, Harmonia linguarum, op. cit., p. 134. (fragment translated
by E. K.).




with the system of ideas. Leibniz was discouraged by the lack of progress in
constructing a universal language so he tried solve the problem differently.
He entered the ongoing debate on the reconstruction of the language
of Adam: he argued that the priority of language doesn’t imply its perfec-
tion. However, Adam received language from God, so it must have been
a perfect language which underwent a process of decay. He explained this
ambiguity through the doctrine of inborn ideas – Adam, as the first man,
was made aware of all ideas through the grace of God. However current
natural languages are a result of the work and effort of everyone.
Leibniz also considered rebuilding natural language. He wanted to con-
struct a universal Latin grammar which would combine the advantages of
different languages’ grammars. In one letter Leibniz writes that the new lan-
guage, which he was planning, would be a continuation of the sign system
included in the Chinese I Ching;11 however while working on this he visibly
drew away from his purpose.
Leibniz’s dream finally crystallized in the project called characteristica
universalis which is connected with another of his ideas: a calculating ma-
chine (calculus ratiocinator) which would be a tool for creating an encyclo-
pedia of all human knowledge. The project had to be based on the rationa-
lized principles of Chinese ideograms because, as he wrote, progress in the
art of reasoning depends on signs and that ideas of things cannot be clearly
perceived by mind. So signs (characters) are used to replace them.
Leibniz considered that if a language as precise as that of Adam was
constructed or at least a true philosophical writing founded on the “alphabet
of human thoughts” it would be possible to conduct a process of under
standing using a kind of calculus, in exactly the same way as problems are
solved In arithmetic or geometry. He believed that the realization of this
project was possible if he could assemble a group of scholars for cooperation.
He thought that then he would be able to create the first stage of
such a calculus, which would contain axioms in the form of ontological
statements.12 Only in this way could mankind gain a new instrument which
would intensify the power of thoughts more than the microscope or telescope
intensified the power of our eyes.13
From the beginning Leibniz wanted to construct such a language as
would discover the order of the system of ideas and would be a useful in-
strument to expand knowledge. However, he came to the conclusion that
11 U. Eco, op. cit., p. 285.
12 M. Gordon, Leibniz, op. cit., p. 100.
13 U. Eco, op. cit., p. 281.
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people cannot arrive at prime concepts – they never will be certain that it
is not possible to further reduce it into its component parts. Therefore, it
is necessary to use those concepts which are most general and which people
can recognize as “primary”.
The philosopher wrote that primary concepts could not be preceded
by characteristica universalis because this language was not to be a precise
instrument of expressing thought, rather it was to be a calculating machine
which would serve to find these thoughts.
Already Leibniz’s purpose was not the construction of such a language
which would discover the system of the order of ideas. He desired to create
a logically perfect language which would lead from the known to the un-
known (as in mathematics) through the application of calculus to characters.
He considered that signs (characters) did not have to be put in place of
some concept but should be used instead of it. Characteristica universalis
was not to help with reasoning – it was to substitute it.14 It would be a kind
of mathematical calculus and the result would be isomorphic with the order
of ideas (and so with the world) because Leibniz thought that God was
a mathematician.
In the Preface to the General Science he wrote:
I dare say that this is the highest effort of the human mind, and when the
project will be accomplished it will simply be up to men to be happy (...). It is
one of my ambitions to accomplish this project if God gives me enough time.15
Leibniz did not manage to fully complete his project. Those scholars
which continued the ideas of the German philosopher headed towards logical
semantics and formalization of the language of mathematics.16
He had no outstanding followers which could continue the project of con-
structing the universal language. In this way Idirl (the Inter-Disciplinary In-
ternational Reference Language) – John Yench’s17 project merits discussion
as a modern a priori language. The book in which the project is included:
A Universal Language for Mankind was published in 2003 but the author
has been working on artificial language since the middle of the XX century.
14 Ibidem, p. 282.
15 After R. Chrisley, S. Begeer, Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts, Taylor & Fran-
cis, 2000, p. 192.
16 The project anticipated programs of formalization of mathematical language as well
as modern considerations on artificial intelligence.
17 John Yench was an American writer (born in Russia, raised in China).
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Idirl is typical of an a priori language project which sets up classification
on the basis of “things” existing in the world; grouping them into eighteen
categories (e.g. matter, form, relation, place, law). The key idea behind the
project is that “the sound sequence of a word reveals its meaning, and there
is no need for a dictionary”.18 The base categories on which Idirl is based
are selected arbitrarily because, as Yench wrote, as yet it is not possible
to get “God’s point of view”. Eighteen categories have been selected so as
to construct a self-indexing language and they are based on Kant’s catego-
ries: quantity, quality, relation, modality. Construction and organization of
the project consisted in carrying out three main postulates: the creation of
a rational phonemic system, basic semantic meaning – morphemes, princi-
ples of grammar.
Yench directly referred to Leibniz as his precursor. He wrote:
Idirl theoretically does more than Leibniz expected of his vision. Leibniz refer-
red to combinatorial analysis as a script but Idirl is also a speakable language.
Applied to this day, Idirl is designed for voice command, of computers and of
servo-mechanisms.19
Idirl’s author considered that the German philosopher did not pore
enough over the nature of human language and a purely mathematical
approach was not conducive to its exploration. Yench has suggested that
he has managed to realize Leibniz’s dream “approaching the idea from
a combined phonemic-semantic view”.20 Phonemic – because pronunciation
will be consistent everywhere; semantic – because the ordinary expressions
used by people would carry the intended sense. He thought that Leibniz in
his dissertation was writing about construction of a universal language in
which “... words would explain themselves. The ‘letters’ (phonemes) making
a Word would tell you its meaning”.21
In his dissertation Leibniz only lay the foundations of his ideas. The ap-
plication of the art of combinatorics did not serve making words self-expla-
natory. First, Leibniz wanted to reveal the “alphabet of human thoughts”
which could model the system of the order of ideas and permit the creation
of wholly true propositions. What is more, he never wanted to make
“self-explanatory words”. Second, in De arte combinatoria Leibniz did not
18 J. Yench, A Universal Language For Mankind, Writers Club Press, New York 2003,
p. 99.
19 Ibidem, p. 19.
20 Ibidem, p. 11.
21 Ibidem, p. 1.
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use “letters” but rather he used numbers which represented simple con-
cepts. Thirdly, Leibniz did not identify graphic signs (letters) with smallest
structural unit of speech (phonemes). Yench, in relation to Leibniz’s conside-
rations, referred only to the ideas included in De arte combinatoria. It seems
that he did not acquaint himself with the subsequent writings of Leibniz,
such as Horizon de la doctrine humaine or Lingua Generalis in which Leibniz
developed his considerations.
Yench wrote that many modern attempts at constructing a universal
language failed, because a posteriori projects are entangled with the same
problems as natural languages. Also he criticized some of the purposes which
the languages’ constructors assumed: unification of scientific terminology
and the achievement of world peace. He considered that a new language is
a way to enrich human life. He needed a new language because:
I wanted to know the name of the grass on which I trod; I wanted to understand
the different textures of rock and their histories (...) I wanted to be sure that
my ideal language would be versatile enough for poetry and humor.22
The first task in constructing the project was to cope with how to write
the phonemes in the new language. Yench proposed “a phonetic formation”
to get through this problem (something corresponding to Mendeleev’s table
of elements in chemistry). This formation would create a connection be-
tween ideas. Adjustment of phonemes would lead to a sound or printed
word and would communicate their meaning. Such a language would not
need a dictionary and the system of morphemes would need no syntax if
“a phonetic formation” would be established in a “natural” and logical way.
Yench considered that “the morphs would supply the mood, the tense, the
number, the case, the person, the gender, the aspect and the punctuation”.23
He assumed implicite that universal meanings really exist. However, much
modern research has shown that identifying even an elementary group of
such universals is an extremely difficult undertaking.
The technical side of Idirl is quite highly-developed and complex.
Yench’s considerations are supported by questionable argumentation and
examples. Idirl was to be a constructed language, which, however, has the
characteristics of the language of paradise. Yench, creating the words of the
New language, assumed further that they are names not merely by conven-
tion but as a result of the relationship between the sound of the name and
22 Ibidem, p. 4.
23 Ibidem, p. 11.
219
Emanuel Kulczycki
the meaning of the thing. He believed that due to the curse of the Tower of
Babel language experienced a “break” between sound and meaning. Yench’s
project was to be a remedy in which “words mean what they mean”.
Yench’s idea should be read rather as writing down the dream of a lan-
guage which could solve all human problems than an authentic project. In
“the utopia of a universal language” a step forward was to be a posteriori
languages which abandoned “the ballast of artifice”. However Idirl appears
to be a step backwards. Yench repeatedly emphasized that his project is
more perfect than Leibniz’s project. Such an opinion is highly unfounded.
From the very beginning both “constructors” have a completely different
idea about how such a project should look and they wanted to realize diffe-
rent purposes by it. Yench’s dream was never Leibniz’s dream.
Leibniz desired to create a language based on the system of ideas con-
tained in human minds. It would constitute a calculus which is used instead
of names in the process of reasoning. However, he came to the conclusion
that it is not possible to indicate simple concepts (Yench considered that
Idirl’s words are just such concept-roots which incorporate the roots of all
languages). The German philosopher abandoned this idea and spent time
on a language project which would lead from the known to the unknown
through its perfect calculus.
Idirl’s strongly underlined destiny as a tool for international communi-
cation conflicts with Leibniz’s opinion that artificial languages can no more
aspire to the role of a universal language of communication than that of
a philosophical language in which is possible to express the logical relation-
ships between concepts.
Abstract
The purpose of the article is to present John Yench’s a priori language as
a continuation of Leibniz’s idea. Before I proceed to show the project of the
Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language, I would like to discuss
the development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s view on artificial languages.
I will try to show the evolution of Leibniz’s universal language: from its
ideal conception to a tool which formalizes the whole of human knowledge.
Also, I will show Leibniz’s influence on further ideas of artificial language.
I will compare his projects with Yench’s language – Idirl. An analysis of
Idirl’s main assumptions will be useful to show the degree of continuation
of Leibniz’s ideas in the a priori language of John Yench.
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